Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Greek Firms by Panayotis Kapopoulos & Sophia Lazaretou
Working  Paper
BANK OF GREECE
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE:
 EVIDENCE FROM GREEK FIRMS
Panayotis Kapopoulos
Sophia Lazaretou





































BANK OF GREECE 
Economic Research Department – Special Studies Division 
21, Ε. Venizelos Avenue 
GR-102 50 Αthens 
Τel: +30210-320  3610 






Printed in Athens, Greece 
at the Bank of Greece Printing Works. 
All rights reserved. Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided 
that the source is acknowledged. 
 
ISSN 1109-6691 CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM 












The Berle-Means thesis (1932) implies that diffuse ownership adversely affects firm 
performance. This paper tries to investigate whether there is strong evidence to 
support the notion that variations across firms in observed ownership structures result 
in systematic variations in observed firm performance. We test this hypothesis by 
assessing the impact of the structure of ownership on corporate performance, 
measured by profitability, using data for 175 Greek listed firms. Following Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) we model ownership structure, first, as an endogenous 
variable and, second, we consider two different measures of ownership structure 
reflecting different groups of shareholders with conflicting interests. Empirical 
findings suggest that a more concentrated ownership structure positively relates to 
higher firm profitability. We also find that higher firm profitability requires a less 
diffused ownership. 
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1.  Introduction  
In their path-breaking study, Berle and Means (1932) warned that the growing 
dispersion of ownership of stocks was giving rise to a potentially value-reducing 
separation of ownership and control. As a consequence, they expected an inverse 
correlation between the diffuseness of shareholdings and corporate performance. This 
analytical framework is based upon the view that shareholder diffusion makes it 
difficult for them to act collectively and hence to influence management to any great 
extent. Can the Board of Directors help rescue this situation? In some cases they 
might not have much influence and they also suffer from the same information 
problems that shareholders have – that is, management typically has much more 
information about the company than either board members of shareholders. And as in 
any principle-agent problem, managers can use their superior information to extract 
rents, to the detriment of shareholder value. Moreover, large compensation for board 
service may have actually acted as a disincentive for active management monitoring, 
given management control over the director appointment and retention process. 
Numerous legal reforms have been proposed for the development of strengthened 
board fiduciary duties or the stimulation of effective institutional shareholder 
activism. This is the theoretical underpinning underlying the current move towards 
equity-based compensation for corporate directors so as to provide them with a 
powerful personal incentive to exercise effective oversight (Bhagat et al. 1999).
1 
In this paper we investigate whether there is evidence to support the notion that 
variations across firms in observed ownership structures result in systematic 
variations in observed firm performance in the context of a small European capital 
market. We test this hypothesis by assessing the impact of the structure of ownership 
on firm performance measured by profitability using data for 175 listed Greek firms 
in 2000, chosen randomly and covering all sectors. To the best of our knowledge, this 
paper is the first study of examining the existence of ownership-performance 
relationship in Greece.
2 The structure of ownership of Greek firms has not been 
                                                           
1 Although the recent reforms arranged under the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley Act impose tougher 
auditing standards, opinion polls among the institutional investors and outside directors reveal that 
they prefer companies to move towards separating the roles of the CEO and the chairman of the Board 
(Felton, 2004).  
2 Recently, Karathanassis and Drakos (2004) examine whether corporate performance is affected by 
ownership structure using data for Greek listed firms. They find no support for a relationship between   6
extensively studied yet, nor has its impact on performance has been assessed. This 
paper tries to fill this gap.  
In addition, this paper examines the case of a small European stock market. Much 
of the existing literature applies to economies with Anglo-Saxon types of financial 
systems (US, UK). The Greek context provides a financial system, recently 
liberalised, that is more bank-based, involving a relatively small stock market in 
which the issue of corporate governance does not have a long history. From this 
perspective, the Greek case provides unique information. The Greek stock market is 
mostly dominated by family-controlled firms. As is well known, in so-called “family 
capitalism”, the agency problem refers to the conflicting relationship between strong 
blockholders and weak minority shareholders (Morck and Steier, 2004). According to 
the data in La Porta et al. (1999), 65% of the 20 largest Greek firms are controlled by 
a few wealthy families, while 30% are state-controlled and only 5% are widely-held 
(i.e., they do not have a controlling shareholder) (see Figure 1). By contrast, in 
economies with Anglo-Saxon types of financial systems, the fraction of shares with 
no controlling shareholder is very high: 80% and 90% for the top 20 US and UK 
firms, respectively. Moreover, it has been shown (see CMC, 2001a; 2001b) that the 
Greek listed firms cannot be considered in any case as having a diffused ownership 
structure.  The dispersion of shares is rather low. In particular, dispersion is about 
36% when shareholders that own less than 1% are taken into account. This figure 
rises to 47% when shareholders that own at least 5% of outstanding shares are taken 
into account.
3 These findings imply that few shareholders control the firm’s 
management. They also provide evidence that medium- and small-sized firms are 
usually controlled by a family and there is no separation of ownership and control.  
  Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985), among others, have 
documented that, when examining the effect that ownership structure has on firm 
profitability, the endogeneity of ownership structure should be accounted for. The 
work by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) is motivated by the need to re-examine the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance taking into account 
                                                                                                                                                                     
corporate value and insiders’ ownership. However, their sample includes relatively few firms (59) and 
they do not take into account the possible endogeneity of both ownership as well as performance.  
3 The most diffused firms are financial services companies (49.9%), construction companies (48.3%) 
and health services companies (39.1%). The less diffused firms are the media sector (14.5%) and  
public sector companies (19.2%). Dispersion is measured as the percentage of shares owned by 
shareholders that hold stakes less than 1 and at least 5 per cent respectively.    7
not only the endogeneity problem but also different dimensions of ownership 
structures.  In particular, they propose the fraction of shares owned by outside 
shareholders and by management should be measured separately because they reflect 
different groups of persons who may have different interests.  
Following Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), we apply similar models to Greek-
listed firms. This paper seeks to add to the extremely limited empirical evidence 
regarding this relationship in the context of a small European capital market. We 
model ownership structure, first, as an endogenous variable and, second, we examine 
two different measures of ownership structure: (a) the fraction of shares owned by 
insiders (top management, CEO, board members) and (b) the fraction of shares 
owned by important outside investors (see, also, Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002).   
Empirical findings suggest that a more concentrated ownership structure is positively 
associated with higher profitability. We also find that higher firm profitability 
requires a less diffused ownership.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the results of 
previous empirical research. Section 3 presents the two measures of corporate 
ownership structures used in our analysis. It also discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of the two widely-used measures of firm performance, namely Tobin’s 
Q and the accounting profit rate. Section 4 describes the model specification used in 
our empirical analysis, while the main findings are presented in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2.  Literature review 
The inverse relationship between ownership diffuseness and firm performance 
was first challenged by Demsetz (1983), who supports the endogeneity of ownership 
structure. The latter is considered as the outcome of strategic decisions of large 
shareholders and smaller investors in capital markets. In practice, the trading of 
shares in a publicly-held corporation reflects the desire of potential and existing 
owners to increase or decrease their stakes. Specifically, Demsetz (1983) argues that 
there is no reason to expect a systematic relationship between profitability and 
ownership structure. Rather, he views ownership structure as the endogenous 
outcome of share trading by profit maximizing shareholders. He argues that it is   8
unlikely a particular ownership would remain in existence (even allowing for the 
costs of trading shares), if it were not profitable. Say, for example, diffuse ownership 
structure did lead to poorer performance. In this case, we would expect to see 
shareholder structures emerge (through trading) which were more concentrated. In 
other words, firms undergo rapid and drastic changes in their ownership structure in 
response to their profitability. The implication is that the degree of share ownership 
concentration is endogenous.  
Since Demsetz’s work, numerous empirical studies investigating this issue have 
been published. Almost all provide evidence relating UK and US firms or Fortune 
500 firms. While some empirical studies find a non-monotonic relation, in general, 
the evidence does not provide strong support for a relation between ownership and 
performance. Most of the studies rely on Tobin’s Q as a measure of corporate 
performance, although a few also examine accounting profit rate, and all prefer 
managerial shareholdings as a measure of ownership structure. 
In a seminal study, Morck et al. (1988) proposed a non-linear relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance. By examining Future 500 firms for 
the year 1980 and using piecewise linear regression, they find a positive relationship 
between Tobin’s Q and ownership structure for the 0 per cent to 5 per cent board 
ownership range, a negative relationship in the 5 per cent to 25 per cent range and a 
positive relationship for board ownership exceeding 25 per cent. They provide the 
following interpretation of this non-monotonic relationship; at low and high levels of 
ownership concentration, the incentive effect of ownership may dominate and lead to 
positive relation. At middle levels of ownership concentration, managers may feel 
entrenched in the sense of not being as concerned about losing their positions due to a 
takeover.
4 However, their results are not robust to the use of accounting-based 
performance measures. McConnell and Servaes (1990) examine NYSE/AMEX firms 
for the years 1976 and 1986. They find an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and insider ownership (officers and directors). Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) consider the relationships among ownership, board structure and performance. 
They also find a non-monotonic relation between ownership and performance; 
                                                           
4 Firms with lower levels of shareholder concentration are more vulnerable to takeovers and hence 
managers have strong incentive to maximize shareholders value in order to protect against takeover –
which can lead to job loss. At middle levels of management, it is a lack of concern about possible job 
loss or it is associated with the fact that any takeover would be unlikely to succeed.    9
positive between 0 per cent and 1 per cent, negative between 1 per cent and 5 per 
cent, positive between 5 per cent and 20 per cent, and negative beyond 20 per cent. 
Short and Keasey (1999) use the market value to book value of equity and the return 
on shareholders’ equity as measures of firm performance and observe, in their sample 
of UK firms, a similar cubic relationship to the one found by Morck et al. (1988) 
between profitability and managerial ownership (directors).    
As Demsetz (1983) had pointed out, empirical studies encountered the 
following problem – namely, ownership might be endogenous. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) provide evidence of the endogeneity of a firm’s ownership structure. Chung 
and Pruitt (1996), using cross-section data in 1987, estimate a simultaneous equations 
model and find that executive equity ownership (CEO) positively affects Tobin’s Q. 
Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) also observe a positive relationship between managerial 
ownership and total factor productivity (managers are defined as top officers and 
board members of a firm). Loderer and Martin (1997) employ a simultaneous 
equations model where they treat performance and ownership as endogenous for a 
sample of acquisitions. They find that insider ownership (officers and directors) is not 
a negative predictor of Q, but Q is a significant negative predictor of insider 
ownership. By contrast, in a simultaneous regression model with cross-section data in 
1991, Cho (1998) reveals that performance is a positive predictor of insider 
ownership (officers and directors) but ownership does not predict performance. In the 
context of a panel data model, Himmelberg et al. (1999) find that managerial 
ownership (top management and directors) has a positive relationship with firm size 
and a negative relationship with the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. Controlling for these 
variables and firm fixed effects, they also do not find any relation between ownership 
and performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) consider both the endogeneity 
problem and the different dimensions of ownership structures. By estimating a 2-
equation model for the US firms, they find that ownership is negatively related to 
debt ratio, unsystematic risk and performance. However, performance (defined as 
Tobin’s Q or the accounting profit rate) is not found to be influenced by ownership 
(defined as managerial ownership (CEO, board of directors, top management) or 
ownership by the five largest shareholders). Welch (2003) applies the Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) model to Australian listed firms. Using a single equation model, 
she also considers a generalized non-linear model specification for the equation of   10
firm performance similar to that used by Morck et al. (1988). She finds limited 
evidence of a non-linear relationship between managerial share ownership and firm 
performance. More recently, Villalonga and Amit (2004) examine the impact of 
family ownership, control and management on firm value. They conclude that family 
ownership creates value only when it is combined with certain forms of control and 
management. Finally, in a study of Taiwan’s electronics industry, Sheu and Yang 
(2005) find that insider ownership (executives, board members and large 
shareholders) has no influence on total factor productivity.  
 
3. Corporate ownership structure and firm performance: data and 
sample selection 
Inspection of ownership data reveals that the concentration of equity ownership 
in 175 Greek listed firms varies widely. Two measures of the structure of corporate 
ownership are used: the fraction of shares (voting rights) owned by a firm’s 
shareholders, each of whom owns at least 5% of outstanding shares (important SH), 
and the fraction of shares owned by a firm’s management (board members, CEO, top 
management), each of whom owns at least 5% of outstanding shares (managerial 
SH).
5 Table 1 lists the frequency distribution of these measures of corporate 
ownership. We note that important SH ranges from 0% to 95.7% around a mean of 
59.0%; managerial SH ranges from 0% to 86.8% around a mean of 32.2%. Simple 
inspection of the data also reveals that the fraction of shares owned by important 
shareholders equals or exceeds 30% in 161 firms (92%) of the 175 firms included in 
our sample. The fraction of shares owned by management is less than 30% for 85 
firms of the 175 firm sample used (49% of the firms) and it is less than or equal to 
10% in 70 firms.  
In the regression analysis, we rely both on the percentage of shares owned by 
important outside investors and the percentage of shares owned by management. The 
distributions of these two variables are skewed. The coefficient of skewness is 
positive, implying that the distribution has a long right tail. To obtain a symmetric 
                                                           
5 The Athens Stock Exchange reports only the percentage of shares that is either equal to, or larger 
than, 5% of outstanding shares. To calculate managerial SH, we examine companies’ annual reports 
that provide information about the potential interdependencies and interrelations among shareholders.    11
distribution, the raw data are converted to log values using the logistic 
transformation, i.e., log[percentage ownership/(100-percentage ownership)].
6   
In our sample, the correlation between the two measures of ownership 
concentration is 0.54. This positive value indicates that many of the important 
shareholders are also defined as management shareholders since they have 
representation on corporate boards. The interests of these board members are unlikely 
to be the same as those of, what they call, “professional managers”, but instead, are 
more likely to coincide with other shareholders. This has the implication, as Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) point out, that management ownership is not a reliable measure 
of the strength of professional management in the firm’s operations because it 
combines groups of individuals (both true managers and board directors) both of 
whom may have different interests. Moreover, even though the correlation is positive, 
it is not sufficiently high to lead to the conclusion that one of the measures is 
redundant. This suggests that professional management does not hold enough shares 
so that it is in a position to ignore important shareholders. An inspection of the raw 
data reveals that, for less than 30% of the total firms in our study, the fraction of 
shares owned by important shareholders is exactly the same as the fraction of shares 
owned by management. This is explained by the fact that in these firms the family 
that owns a large fraction of the firm’s shares is also present on the corporate board. 
But, as Table 1 shows, it is less likely for professional managers to hold a large 
fraction of shares. In an attempt to take a more accurate picture of the ownership-
performance relation, in the empirical analysis we use both measures.  
In the empirical studies of ownership-performance relationship, two measures 
of firm performance are typically used. The accounting profit rate was used in the 
Demsetz and Lehn study (1985), while Tobin’s Q was used in most of the studies that 
followed (see, for example, Morck et al., 1988; Cho, 1988; Loderer and Martin, 
1997; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; and Demsetz 
and Villalonga, 2001). Tobin’s Q is defined as the firm’s market value divided by its 
assets, valued either at book or replacement value (Shepherd, 1990). The Q ratio is 
used as a proxy for the market valuation of the firm’s assets. The accounting profit 
                                                           
6 In the estimation procedure, we use both transformed and non-transformed variables of ownership. 
The empirical results seem to be unaffected by the transformation and, therefore, the general nature of 
the paper’s conclusions does not change.    12
rate is measured as the ratio of net income (after taxes) to the book value of equity. It 
is an estimate of what management has accomplished.  
  There are two major differences between these two measures of performance. 
Briefly, we note that the first difference relates to the time perspective. Tobin’s Q, 
based on investors’ evaluations of the likely future profitability of the firm, is forward 
looking; whereas, the profit rate is backward looking. Thus, a high Q ratio indicates 
success in the sense that the firm has deployed its investment to build up a company 
that is now valued more in the market than its book value. The second difference 
concerns accounting problems in measuring performance. The profit rate is measured 
by the accountant, “constrained by standards set by his profession” and, therefore, it 
is affected by accounting practices, such as the different methods applied to assess 
tangible and intangible assets. Different methods of depreciation can also influence 
(raise or lower) the recorded profit levels.  In contrast, Tobin’s Q is measured by 
investors and, thus, it is affected by their psychology, concerning estimates of future 
events (herd behaviour, mistakes, manipulations, etc.).
7  
Tobin’s Q also suffers, like accounting profitability, from accounting artifact 
problems for several reasons. First, as the ratio of the firm’s market value to the 
replacement cost of tangible capital approximates Q, it does not reflect the value 
investors assign to a firm’s intangible capital nor does it include investments made in 
intangible assets. As Lindberg and Ross (1981) point out, Tobin’s Q is high when the 
firm has valuable intangible assets in addition to tangible ones. Second, empirical 
studies in the area of the impact of ownership structure on profitability that use 
Tobin’s Q do not measure the replacement cost of tangible capital. Instead, they use 
as a proxy the book value of total assets. Book values generally have serious 
problems of their own caused by inflation and arbitrary depreciation choices. 
Moreover, replacement costs are very difficult to appraise.
8   
 
 
                                                           
7 For an analytical discussion of the aspects in which these two measures of firm performance differ 
and their advantages and disadvantages, see Smirlock et al. (1984) and Shepherd (1986).   
8 According to the Lindberg and Ross model (1981) replacement cost can be measured by using a 
perpetual inventory method and making sensible adjustments for capital goods price inflation, the 
depreciation rate and technological progress.  See also Dickerson et al. (2002) for a calculation of the 
replacement cost for the UK companies in manufacturing.    13
4. Model specification 
 We are interested in examining the relationship between the variation in 
ownership variables and firm profitability. To this end, we choose a random sample 
of 175 Greek listed firms. The firm sample covers all sectors of the Greek economy 
and the data refers to the year 2000. The sample includes utilities and financial 
institutions, which are part of the broader Greek public sector. Thus, a sub-sample 
excluding these firms is also examined.  
  The main objective is to discover if important SH and managerial SH are 
systematically related to firm performance. For this purpose, both variables appear as 
explanatory variables in the firm performance equation. However, as we have already 
noted, firm performance is not only determined by ownership structures but also may 
influence ownership structures. To deal with this issue, the econometric model is a 
simultaneous system of two equations, in which firm performance is the dependent 
variable in the first equation and ownership structure is the dependent variable in the 
second equation. It is estimated by ordinary least squares and two-stages least squares 
to detect whether different methods of estimation may affect the results.  
  Specifically, the estimated equations are as follows: 
 
Firm performancei= constant1 + αi1 SHi + βi1 Xi + ui1   (eq.1) 
SHi= constant2 + αi 2 Firm performancei + βi2 Zi + ui2   (eq.2) 
 
where  SHi is a measure of corporate ownership structure for the ith firm, Xi and Zi 
are control variables and ui1 and ui2 are error terms.  
  Concerning equation (1), we estimate it using both alternate measures of 
performance, namely Tobin’s Q and the accounting profit rate. We approximate 
Tobin’s Q taking the ratio of the firm’s market value plus the book value of its debt to 
the book value of total assets.
9 The set of explanatory variables includes both 
ownership variables, important SH and managerial SH, and we seek to examine 
whether ownership structures significantly affect profitability.  
                                                           
9 In our analysis, we do not follow Lindberg-Ross (1981) method to calculate the replacement cost of 
tangible capital, since it would require time-series data on individual firms which we do not have.    14
  Previous empirical work includes additional variables in the regressions to 
control for the possibility that factors other than ownership structure may have an 
impact on Tobin’s Q. Control variables include distribution expenses as a fraction of 
sales revenues, debt to book value of total assets (leverage) and the market 
concentration ratio. Distribution expenses are used to explain differences in 
measurements of Tobin’s Q that are caused by accounting artifacts. Accounting 
practices do not treat intangible and tangible capital similarly. As noted, performance 
measure of Tobin’s Q may be distorted because its denominator (i.e. the replacement 
cost of tangible capital or the book value of total assets) does not take into account 
the value of intangible assets.
10 Leverage is included in the set of explanatory 
variables to capture the “value enhancing or value reducing effects of the differences 
that might exist between the interest obligations incurred when borrowing took 
place…” (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, p.221).  In inflationary periods, debt sold in 
an earlier period will be paid back in money of a lesser value; in deflation, it will be 
paid back in money with a higher value. Two indicators of market concentration are 
alternatively used: the top four firm concentration ratio (CR4) and a Herfindahl 
measure of market structure (Hindex). CR4 is the sum of the four largest shares in the 
market, while Hindex is the sum of squared market shares of all firms in the market. 
Concentration indicators are used to account for the cross-firm variations in Tobin’s 
Q of the profit rate that are due to cross-firm differences in pricing power. Firms that 
are more efficient and more aggressive in pricing have greater market shares. The 
usual finding in the industrial organization literature is that market structure 
positively relates to firm performance. Finally, dummy variables U, F, and Media
11 
are also included for utilities and financial institutions, and media industries. U and F 
dummies control for the effect of “systematic regulation”, while Media controls for 
the “amenity potential of the firms”.  
Regarding equation (2), the dependent variable is managerial shareholdings. 
Firm performance measures, either Tobin’s Q or the accounting profit rate, appear as 
an explanatory variable so as to examine the possibility of reverse causation in the 
                                                           
10 Observable measures of these intangible assets include R and D expenditures, land, building and 
equipment expenditures or even distribution expenses. In our data set, distribution expenses cover 
mainly advertising and marketing expenses. However, data for capital and R and D expenditures do 
not exist for the most of the firms in our sample.  
11 The variable U takes the value 1 if a firm is a utility and zero elsewhere; F takes the value 1 if a firm 
is a financial institution; Media takes the value 1 if a firm is a media industry.    15
ownership-profitability relationship. Firm size as measured by the book value of total 
assets and leverage appear in the set of control variables in equation (2). Firm size 
enters to capture the effect of the “value-maximizing size of the firm”. The larger is 
the size of the firm, ceteris paribus, the larger one it’s capital resources and the 
greater the market value of a given fraction of shares. In other words, larger firm size 
requires more investment from a shareholder and, thus, implies a more diffuse 
ownership structure. Including leverage as an independent variable reflects the notion 
that management chooses not to hold as many shares if creditors may add to the 
monitoring management of the firm. Thus, high values of the debt-to-assets ratio 
should be associated with lower fractions of shares owned by large shareholders and, 
thus, the more diffused the ownership structure of the firm. Finally, as in equation (1), 
the dummy variables U, F and Media are included in the right-hand side of the 
equation.  
Table 2 reports the mean values, standard deviations, maxima and minima of 
the variables in the 175 firm sample. Variable definitions and data sources are 
provided in a Data Appendix at the end of the paper.  
 
5. Empirical results 
The Berle-Means (1932) thesis implies that diffuse ownership adversely affects 
firm performance. We test this hypothesis by assessing the impact of the structure of 
ownership on profitability taking into account the endogeneity of ownership structure 
and modelling separately inside and outside ownership. Table 3 presents the results 
from the model estimation using Tobin’s Q as a firm performance measure when 
managerial ownership is taken into account. It uses the total sample size (175 firms) 
and compares OLS estimates to 2SLS estimates. Table 4 uses the smaller firm sample 
size (163 firms) excluding utilities and financial institutions. Focusing on OLS 
estimates for the profitability equation, we note that profitability is always 
statistically dependent on at least one measure of ownership structure. The regression 
coefficient of the fraction of shares owned by important outside investors takes a 
positive sign and is statistically significant. This implies that outside investor 
shareholdings affect positively Tobin’s Q ratio. This finding is consistent with what 
one would expect: greater ownership concentration by outside investors may lead to 
superior performance. The second measure of ownership concentration, namely the   16
fraction of shares owned by management, also has a positive effect on performance, 
although the coefficient is statistically significant at much lower levels of significance 
(10% or 15%). This result is consistent with the finding that the simple correlation 
coefficient between the two ownership variables is 0.54. Moreover, the results shown 
in the tables for the 2SLS estimates confirm the finding for the effect of ownership 
concentration on profitability. The coefficients of both ownership variables, 
important SH and managerial SH, have the correct positive sign and are statistically 
significant either at a much higher (1%) or a lower (10%) level of significance.  
Another finding shown in Tables 3 and 4 is the negative effect of the debt-to-
assets ratio on profitability. In all OLS and 2SLS estimates, leverage negatively 
affects profitability. The distribution-to-sales ratio is positive, as expected, but 
strongly insignificant. Market concentration consistently has a positive effect on 
profitability. The coefficient of the CR4 concentration index takes a positive sign and 
is sometimes statistically significant at the 10% level or better. However, when we 
adopt a Herfindahl indicator, our data do not support this finding.
12 The coefficient, 
even though has the correct sign, is everywhere insignificant. The picture is reversed 
when we estimate equation (1) with 2SLS. Nevertheless, the data do not seem to 
support the usual finding of industrial organization studies that profitability is partly 
driven by industry concentration.  
One might expect that high profitability leads management to acquire more 
shares and, therefore, causes managerial shareholdings to be greater. OLS estimates 
show that Tobin’s Q is empirically significant in explaining the variation in the 
structure of corporate ownership. In all regressions (of either sample size), the 
coefficient of Tobin’s Q is positive and significant at a high level of significance. 
However, the results for the 2SLS equation estimates of the Tobin’s Q cast doubt on 
this result. The 2SLS estimates are positive but hardly significant (lower than 15%).
13  
As Demsetz and Lehn (1985) have shown, the ownership structure of the media 
industry is more concentrated than that of industries concerning manufacturing, 
utility and financial firms. We find that the dummy variable Media is positive and 
                                                           
12 The results obtained using the Herfindahl index are available from the authors upon request.  
13 Before using any method to deal with endogeneity, we first test for the endogeneity of the ownership 
structure and firm performance by carrying out the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (see Hausman, 1978). It 
is based upon a direct comparison of coefficient values and is carried out by running an auxiliary   17
significant at 5% (OLS estimate) or 10% (2SLS estimate). In the profitability 
equation it enters negatively but it is insignificant. The positive coefficient on media 
industry suggests that, ceteris paribus, ownership is more concentrated in media 
firms with non-profit maximizing goals relative to firms operating in other industries. 
In other words, the utility (U) and financial (F) dummies isolate the impact of 
“systematic regulation”. As shown in the tables, the OLS estimates for U and F 
dummies have the expected negative sign and are sometimes significant. These 
findings, however, are not confirmed by 2SLS estimates.
14  
Finally, OLS and 2SLS estimates suggest that size does not seem to be able to 
explain variations in ownership structure. Using the total firm sample size, the 
coefficient on firm size, as measured by the book value of total assets, is negative as 
expected, but insignificant. However, the picture changes when we exclude utilities 
and financial institutions; firm size becomes significant.  
So far, we have treated only the fraction of shares owned by management as the 
endogenous component of corporate ownership structure. Equations (1) and (2) are 
re-estimated treating important outside investors shareholdings as the endogenous 
variable in equation (2). Tables 5 and 6 report the OLS and 2SLS estimates. As 
shown, both measures of ownership structure explain variations in Tobin’s Q. 
However, as OLS and 2SLS estimates reveal, the coefficient of Tobin’s Q is more 
strongly statistically significant in the ownership structure equation, implying that 
firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q has a stronger effect on the fraction of 
shares owned by important outside investors than it does on managerial 
shareholdings. Therefore, as the findings suggest, important SH is likely to be more 
strongly endogenous.  
The low value of the simple correlation coefficient between Tobin’s Q and the 
accounting profit rate (0.157) suggests that we cannot consider the two measures of 
performance to be redundant. Therefore, we can re-estimate equations (1) and (2) 
using the accounting rate of return as an alternative measure of firm performance in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
regression (see also Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993).  It is an asymptotic t-test with the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity. The t-values found reject the null hypothesis.  
14 The utilities dummy variable used refers to the public sector companies. Therefore, the findings 
concerning U dummy could provide useful policy implementation results, especially in the light of the 
ongoing debate in the Greek economy about the performance and efficiency of stated-owned 
companies.    18
place of Tobin’s Q.
15 We note that the coefficients that link ownership variables to 
firm profitability are weaker compared with the estimates obtained using Tobin’s Q. 
Specifically, important shareholdings continue to have a positive and significant 
(although at a lower than 10% level) effect on profit rate, whereas managerial 
shareholdings are everywhere insignificant. Moreover, in all estimates of the 
ownership structure equation (of either sample size), the profit rate positively and 
significantly affects managerial shareholdings. Overall, the results provide no reason 
to alter considerably the conclusions we reach concerning the ownership-performance 
relationship.  
 
6. Conclusions  
This paper brings together various aspects of corporate finance and firm 
performance and examines whether variations across firms in observed ownership 
structures result in systematic variations in observed firm performance in the context 
of a small European capital market. We test this hypothesis by assessing the impact 
of the structure of ownership on performance using data for 175 Greek listed firms. 
We use two measures of performance – namely, Tobin’s Q and the accounting profit   
rate - and consider two measures of ownership – namely, the fraction of shares owned 
by management and the fraction of shares owned by important investors. The paper is 
primarily motivated by a lack of evidence regarding the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance in Greek firms. Moreover, ownership is 
modelled as multi-dimensional and endogenously determined.    
Empirical findings indicate that there exists a linear positive relationship 
between profitability and ownership structure. Both measures of ownership, 
managerial shareholdings and important shareholdings, positively influence Tobin’s 
Q. The results suggest that the greater the degree to which shares are concentrated in 
the hands of outside or inside shareholders, the more effectively management 
behavior is monitored and disciplined, thus resulting in better performance.  
The results from our study also yield evidence for the endogeneity of 
ownership structure. We find that profitability is a positive predictor of ownership 
structure measures, suggesting that the coefficient of a single equation model on 
                                                           
15 The results obtained using the accounting rate of return are available from the authors upon request.    19
ownership-profitability relationship is biased because of its failure to take into 
account the complexity of interests involved in an ownership structure. On the one 
side, Greek data reveal a significant positive impact of ownership structure on 
profitability. On the other side, there exists evidence that superior firm performance 
leads to an increase in the value of stock options owned by management or large 
shareholders, which if exercised, would increase their share ownership.   
We also find that profitability is negatively related to the debt-to-assets ratio. 
This evidence reveals the existence of reducing effects of the differences between the 
interest obligations incurred when borrowing took place and the interest rates that 
prevailed during the sample period. The statistical insignificance of the relationship 
between profitability and distribution-to-sales ratio indicates that our model fails to 
explain differences in measurements of Tobin’s Q that are caused by accounting 
artifacts. Lastly, we find that profitability is positively related to market concentration 
(measured by CR4 concentration ratio). This can be considered either as the result of 
scale economies in the most of the sectors of our sample or as a consequence of the 
fact that larger firms in markets with oligopoly structure are able to exercise market 
power. However, when we use the Herfindahl index as proxy for the degree of 
concentration, we cannot detect a strongly significant relationship with firm 
performance.  
A striking evidence of our empirical analysis is the significant positive 
relationship found between media dummy and ownership structure. This result, in 
conjunction with the finding that the media dummy enters negatively the profitability 
equation (even though it is insignificant), means that firms in the media industry with 
high “amenity potential” could not be used to produce these non-profit amenities if 
they were less diffused. This result might explain the recent attempts of the Greek 
government to reform the corporate governance legislation so as to forbid 
concentration of a share above 1% in the hands of the same shareholder. This legal 
reform aims at excluding chiefly those that undertake the construction of public 
works from a strict management control of media firms so as to reduce corruption 
incentives.   
A caveat is in order. As we have already mentioned, the Athens Stock 
Exchange reports only the percentage of shares that is either equal or larger than 5% 
of outstanding shares. According to the current institutional framework, firms do not   20
have the legal obligation to announce changes in voting rights for those owners with a 
share below 5%. Consequently, the lack of data for equity owners with a share below 
5% imposes a constraint on our empirical analysis. It causes a discontinuity in the 
observations used in the construction of the ownership structure variable. A more 
rigorous definition of that variable would take into account the fraction of shares 
owned by a firm’s shareholders or management, each of whom owns at least 1% of 
outstanding shares.  
Suggestions for further research include the development and estimation of a 
generalized non-linear model specification. Some authors (Morck et al., 1988; Welch, 
2003) have estimated the relationship between managerial share ownership and 
profitability in the context of a non-linear single equation model. However, they do 
not control for the possible endogeneity of a firm’s ownership structure. It might be 
interesting to address the issue of a non-monotonic relationship by developing a non-
linear equation model taking into account both endogeneity and non-linearity. 
Further, the data sample used in this study covers a relatively large number of Greek 
listed firms for the year 2000. One would expect to calculate the variables for a 
longer period of two or five years so as to avoid the impact of the business cycle. 
Data availability is a serious constraint in our analysis. The Athens Stock Exchange 
started to publish information concerning the changes in voting rights only from 
2000. Therefore, it might be informative to replicate the estimates using panel data 
for some years after 2000. In this case, however, the firm sample would change and 
the results might not be comparable.
16 Also, firm coverage would be limited, since we 
require a minimum of a three-year presence for each firm in the sample.  
                                                           
16 Balance-sheet data are now available until 2003. In the period 2001-2003, many firms became new 
members of the Athens Stock Exchange Market.    21
Data appendix 
We use the standard industry classification followed by the Athens Stock 
Exchange Market. Firms are selected from all sectors of the Greek economy. These 
are: Banks (5 firms), Insurance (3 firms), Leasing Companies (2 firms), Information 
Technology (10 firms), Telecommunications (3 firms), Oil Refineries (1 firm), 
Water Supply (1 firm), Passenger Shipping (3 firms), Shipyards (1 firm), Publishing 
and Printing (7 firms), Television and Entertainment (3 firms), Health (3 firms), 
Metals (9 firms), Metal Products (7 firms), Machinery and Appliances (2 firms), 
Cables (1 firms), Electronic Equipment (1 firm),  Industrial Minerals (7 firms), 
Wholesale Trade (21 firms), I.T. Equipment (5 firms), Retail Trade (7 firms), 
Mobile Telephony Retail Services (1 firm), Food (13 firms), Tobacco (1 firm),   
Restaurants (3 firms), Textiles (10 firms), Clothing (3 firms), Real Estate (3 firms), 
Construction (15 firms), Chemicals (2 firms), Plastics and Rubber (5 firms), Paper 
and Packaging (1 firm), Wood and Cork Products (2 firms), Furniture (3 firms), 
Vehicle Manufacturing (1 firm), Motor Vehicle Trade and Maintenance (1 firm), 
Transport Rental Services (1 firm), Freight Forwarding (1 firm), Jewellery (1 firm), 
Fish Farming (3 firms), Agriculture and Farming (3 firms).  It is worth noting that 
the sample includes 9 firms from the media industry, 10 from financial services and 
2 utility firms.  
  Firm capitalization as a percentage of market capitalization ranges from 
0.01% to 8.62%, around a mean of 0.46% with a standard deviation of 1.18%. Firm 
capitalization is below 0.5% of market capitalization for 149 firms, is between 0.5 
to 1% for 13 firms, 2 to 5% for 9 firms and 5 to 9% for 4 firms in our sample. As 
the data for important and managerial shareholdings show, important shareholders 
have the ability to control management. Further, a simple inspection of the firms’ 
annual reports reveals that in their majority the firms used in our sample are family-
owned, where the family of the owner has the control of the management. 
Specifically, based on the voting rights and according to the identity of the largest 
direct owner, 75.4% of the firms in our sample are classified as family-owned, 5.1% 
as state-owned, 6.3% as private widely-held and 13.1% are held by a large 
shareholder.  
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Q:  Tobin’s Q. The numerator is the firm’s market value of common stock plus the 
book value of its debt in 2000 (end-of-year). The denominator is the book value 
of total assets in 2000 (end-of-year). Annual data for the year 2000, in thousands 
euro. Source: Athens Stock Exchange Market, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 
Trading of Bonds and Stocks, 2001.  
Prate: accounting profit rate defined as the ratio of net income to book value of 
equity (end-of-year). Annual data of net income and of equity (book value) for 
the year 2000, in thousands euro. Source: Athens Stock Exchange Market, 
Yearbook 2001, Balance Sheets.  
Important SH: the logarithm of [percentage ownership/(100-percentage ownership)]. 
Percentage ownership is measured as the fraction of shares owned by a firm’s 
important shareholders, each of whom owns at least 5% of outstanding shares. 
The data refer to 2000; voting rights measurement. Source: www.ase.gr. 
Managerial SH: the logarithm of [percentage ownership/(100-percentage 
ownership)]. Percentage ownership is measured as the fraction of shares owned 
by a firm’s management (top management, CEO, board members), each of whom 
owns at least 5% of outstanding shares. The data refer to 2000; voting rights 
measurement. Source: www.ase.gr. 
Debt: Long-term liabilities to total assets. Annual data on liabilities and assets for the 
year 2000, in thousands euro (end-of-year).  Source: Athens Stock Exchange 
Market, Yearbook 2001, Balance Sheets.  
Firm size: total assets (end-of-year). Annual data for the year 2000, in thousands euro 
Source: Athens Stock Exchange Market, Yearbook 2001, Balance Sheets.  
Distr: distribution expenses to sales (end-of-year). Annual data for the year 2000, in 
thousands euro. Source: Athens Stock Exchange Market, Yearbook 2001, 
Balance Sheets, and Bank of Greece.  
CR4: top 4 firm concentration index computed as the sum of the market shares of 4 
largest firms in the market. Market share is computed as the ratio of total assets 
of the ith firm to total assets of all firms in the market (in thousands euro). End-
of-year data for 2000. Source: Greek Financial Directory, ICAP, 2002.    23
Hindex: Herfindahl concentration index, computed as the sum of the squared market 
shares of all firms in the market. Market share is computed as the ratio of total 
assets of the ith firm to total assets of all firms in the market (in thousands euro).  
End-of-year data for 2000. Source: Greek Financial Directory, ICAP, 2002.  
Media: It takes the value 1 if a firm is a media industry and 0 elsewhere. 
F:  It takes the value 1 if a firm is a financial institution and 0 elsewhere. 
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Table 1A.  Frequency distribution of measures of corporate structure (175 listed firms) 











0-9.9 8 4.57 4.57 68 38.86 38.86
10-19.9 1 0.57 5.14 6 3.43 42.29
20-29.9 5 2.86 8.00 12 6.86 49.14
30-39.9 11 6.29 14.29 12 6.86 56.00
40-49.9 19 10.86 25.14 22 12.57 68.57
50-59.9 44 25.14 50.29 16 9.14 77.71
60-69.9 26 14.86 65.14 13 7.43 85.14
70-79.9 36 20.57 85.71 16 9.14 94.29
80-89.9 23 13.14 98.86 10 5.71 100.00





Table 1B. Summary statistics (in per cent) 
 
Variable N  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Important SH  175 59.054 20.382 95.660  0.000
Managerial SH  175 32.218 29.308 86.800  0.000
Note: N is the number of observations. Important SH is the fraction of shares owned by a 








Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Q 175  2.184 2.459 24.555 0.161 
Important SH  175  1.025 0.546 3.137 0.000 
Managerial SH 175  0.517 0.557 2.025 0.000 
Prate 175  0.060 0.317 0.712 -3.837 
Debt 175  0.058 0.108 0.538 0.000 
Firm size  175      865.2       4300.7    43307.6  5.500 
Distr 175  0.097 0.099 0.554 0.000 
CR4 175  0.390 0.207 0.978 0.102 
Hindex 175  0.080 0.111 0.566 0.005 
Note: Q is Tobin’s Q, important SH is the fraction of shares owned by 
important shareholders converted to log values, managerial SH is the fraction 
of shares owned by management converted to log values, prate is accounting 
profit rate, firm size is total assets (in millions euro), debt is debt-to-assets 
ratio, distr is distribution-to-sales ratio, CR4 and Hindex are two alternative 
definitions of industry concentration. N is the number of firms. Variables’ 
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Table 3.  Estimates of ownership-performance relationship (Full 175 firm sample 
size) 
 























































































se 2.284  0.528     
Adj-R
2 0.177  0.131    
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stages Least Squares estimation of ownership-
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Table 4. Estimates of ownership-performance relationship (163 firm sample size 
-excluding utilities and financial services) 
 







































































se 2.343  0.533     
Adj-R
2 0.161  0.112     
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stages Least Squares estimation of ownership-
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Table 5. Estimates of ownership-performance relationship (Full 175 firm sample 
size) 
 























































































se 2.284  0.496     
Adj-R
2 0.177  0.202     
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stages Least Squares estimation of ownership-



















                                                                  
Table 6.  Estimates of ownership-performance relationship (163 firm sample 
size - excluding utilities and financial services) 
 







































































se 2.343  0.496     
Adj-R
2 0.161  0.159     
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stages Least Squares estimation of ownership-





























Who owns US, UK and Greek firms?




no controlling shareholder family-controlled
state-controlled widely-held financial  
widely-held nonfinancial  other
 
 
Note: Fraction of 20 largest firms with different types of controlling shareholders is 
shown for each country. A firm is categorized as narrowly-held (either directly or 
indirectly) if 10 per cent of the voting rights associated with shares in that firm are 
held by one shareholder or a group of shareholders.  
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